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Herbert Hovenkamp*
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Abstract
The marginalist revolution in economics became the foundation for the modern
regulatory State with its “mixed” economy. Marginalism, whose development defines the
boundary between classical political economy and neoclassical economics, completely
overturned economists’ theory of value. It developed in the late nineteenth century in England,
the Continent and the United States. For the classical political economists, value was a function
of past averages. One good example is the wage-fund theory, which saw the optimal rate of
wages as a function of the firm’s ability to save from previous profits. Another is the theory of
corporate finance, which assessed a corporation’s worth by looking at how much capital had
been paid in. Marginalism substituted forwarded looking theories based on expectations about
firm and market performance. The optimal rate of wages became the laborer’s expected
contribution to the value of the employer; and the value of the corporation became the firm’s
anticipated profits. Marginalism swept through university economics in the United States, and
by 1920 or so virtually every academic economist was a marginalist.
As a theory of value, marginalism was much more realistic than classical political
economy about how market actors behave. At the same time, however, valuations based on
expectations about the future, which necessarily included risk, required both more technical
analysis and the accommodation of more uncertainty. These changes had a powerful effect on
the development of modern regulatory policy in the United States.
Marginalism upended many of the classical conceptions about the market, including
assumptions about their robustness, as well as the need for regulation and the optimal type. For
regulatory policy the most important issues were: (1) The fixed-cost controversy and the scope of
natural monopoly; (2) cost classification, incentives, and ratemaking; (3) the changing domain of
market failure (4) market diversity and the rise of sector regulation; (5) deregulation; (6)
concerns about the distribution of wealth; and (6) the assessment of risk. The final section
examines risk management under marginalism by looking at two diverse but important areas:
negligence and products liability in tort law, and administrative review of patents by the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board.

*

James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania School of Law and The Wharton School. A
shorter version of this paper is intended for presentation at a program entitled “New Perspectives on U.S.
Regulatory History: Past and Present of Public Utilities and Antitrust Law,” June 4-5, 2018, Harvard
Business School. Thanks to Erik Hovenkamp for commenting on portions of a draft.
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Introduction
Of all the effects of the neoclassical revolution in economics, few have been more
profound and lasting as its impact on the theory and policy of regulation. The marginalist
revolution in economics became the foundation for the modern regulatory State with its “mixed”
economy. The so-called “marginal revolution,” which best identifies the dividing line between
classical and neoclassical economics, originated in the work of William Stanley Jevons in
England, Carl Menger in Austria, Leon Walras in Switzerland, and a little later John Bates Clark
in the United States.1 The initial work was done in the 1860s and 1870s. In the United States the
dispute over marginalism led to an upheaval in the American Economic Association, which had
been founded in 1885.2 The neoclassicists eventually won out and marginalist approaches swept
the field. Today every mainstream economist is some kind of marginalist.
Formulating marginalism into what became modern price theory and industrial
organization became the task of a second generation of marginalists -- most notably Alfred
Marshall of Cambridge, whose Principles of Economics was published in 1890 and went through
numerous editions.3 Marginalism completely upended classical political economy’s theory of
value, which had largely been drawn from averages of past experience. For example, the optimal
rate of wages was dictated by the wage-fund doctrine, which held that the fund available for the
payment of wages was determined by the amount of capital retained from previous production.
This then had to be divided among the number of workers.4 If a firm’s wages exceeded this
amount it would end up borrowing against the future, which was a road to insolvency. An
analytically similar classical doctrine was the theory of corporate finance that the value of a
corporation equaled the amount of capital that had been paid into the corporation.5 The
marginalist critique of these doctrines observed that they had little to do with actual market
behavior. The wage that an employer is willing to pay is not based on the amount in some
historical fund, but on the employer’s expectations about how much value the employee will
contribute to the firm.6 Equally, the value of a corporation is not a function of the amount of
capital that has been paid in, but rather the firm’s prospects for the future. As one early twentieth
century treatise on corporate finance observed concerning the change, “there is very seldom even
a close correspondence between the original investment of capital and the value of a

1

See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL THOUGHT, 1870-1970 at
27-32 (2015); MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 277-310 (3d ed. 1997). See WILLIAM
STANLEY JEVONS, THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1871); CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS
(1871); LEON WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS (1874); JOHN BATES CLARK, THE
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: A THEORY OF WAGES, INTERESTS AND PROFITS (1899).
2
See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note __ at 75-76.
3
ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890).
4
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 at 193-198 (1991).
5
HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note __, 159-171.
6
E.g., CLARK, DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH, supra note __ (developing marginal productivity theory of
wages).
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corporation’s assets.”7 These changes in economics’ methodology of evaluation reflected the
general rule of marginalism that value is based on a maximizing actor’s willingness to pay or to
accept for a given good or opportunity. While the classical theory of value looked backward, the
marginalist theory looked forward.
Marginalism upended many of the classical conceptions about the market and, in the
process, about the need for regulation and the optimal type. For regulatory policy the most
important issues were: (1) The fixed-cost controversy and the scope of natural monopoly; (2)
cost classification, incentives, and ratemaking; (3) the changing domain of market failure (4)
market diversity and the rise of sector regulation; (5) deregulation; (6) concerns about the
distribution of wealth; and (6) the assessment of risk.
The marginalist revolution in economics made modern, sector-specific agency regulation
inevitable, at least within the framework that marginalist economics chose.8 To be sure, the
development of regulatory agencies is historically contingent. One can also imagine a world in
which we have fewer of them, or their jurisdictional boundaries over subject matter or geography
differ from the arrangements that we have. The fact is, however, that the complexity of issues
created by marginalism, including accounting for risk and distributional concerns, made them
essential nonetheless. It is one thing to roll back the clock on regulation; it is quite another to
roll it back on marginalism itself.
One of marginalism’s most threatening aspects was that it imposed a significant measure
of subjective choice into policy making. The conception of markets in nineteenth century
political economy was that they were an objective part of the laws of nature. Classical political
economists sometimes spoke of the laws of the economy as a part of natural law.9 A popular
nineteenth century American text initially written by Brown University’s Francis Wayland and
later co-authored with Aaron Chapin declared that:
Political Economy is that branch of Social Science which treats the production and
application of wealth to the well-being of men in society. It is a branch of true science….
By Science, as the word is here used, we mean a Systematic arrangement of the laws
which God has established, so far as they have been discovered, of any department of
human knowledge.10
Marginalism and the resulting regulation were stunningly different from this conception
of economic science. Nearly every decision to regulate leads to a menu of policy choices.
Different jurisdictions make different choices, and it is not always clear that one works better
than another. Further, different approaches may work better in different environments.
Regulation often invites experimentation and necessarily criticism about the amount or the
particular direction regulation has taken. This rhetoric continues to appear in the debate between
7

WILLIAM HENRY LOUGH AND FREDERICK WILLIAM FIELD, CORPORATION FINANCE: AN EXPOSITION OF
THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS GOVERNING THE PROMOTION, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF
MODERN CORPORATIONS 125, 127, 128, 130-131 (1909; 7th ed. 1916).
8

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
E.g., HENRY WOOD, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL LAW 18-19 (1894).
10
FRANCIS WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 348 (recast by Aaron L. Chapin, 1886).
9
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the advocates for regulation and its detractors. Just to give one example, the perceived need for
regulation of the business corporation and its shareholders or creditors began to loom large
during the Gilded Age, particularly in the “watered stock” scandals. The regulatory experiments
that resulted included state “blue sky” laws,11 and in the federal government the U.S. Industrial
Commission (1898-1902), the Federal Bureau of Corporations (1903-1915), and eventually the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Also inherent in marginalism’s emphasis on expected value was greatly increased use of
mathematics. As a result, the initial division between traditionalists and marginalists was
generational. Older economists lacked the training in mathematics that the new economics
required, and they naturally resisted it.12 The models that marginalist economists developed took
expected value and risk into account. Because pricing decisions are made at the margin,
neoclassical economics provided a technical basis for dividing the behavior of markets or firms
into shorter or longer “runs” or time periods. It produced technical cost classifications into longrun and short-run costs, including the development of the marginal cost curve, perhaps the most
distinctive mathematical feature of marginalism. The marginal revenue curve came a generation
later.13
Closely related was increased attention to the theory of competition, and increasing
awareness that “perfect” competition is the exception rather than the rule. Rather, competition
exists in degrees, depending mainly on the number of firms and the types of costs that each firm
faces.14 The full implications had to await the early 1930s and the work of Robinson and
Chamberlin on imperfect and monopolistic competition.15 Joseph Schumpeter had the
prescience to see this in the mid-thirties, in a review of Joan Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect
Competition.16 Prior to that time economists had treated competition and monopoly as the only
market structures worth systematic examination, and everything in between as “an academic
curiosity.” However, if this intermediate range should emerge as dominant then the traditional
laissez faire assumption that markets should be left alone could cease to hold true. Instead, the

11

See, e.g., William W. Cook, "Watered Stock" -- Commissions -- "Blue Sky Laws" -- Stock Without Par
Value, 19 MICH. L. REV. 583, 584 (1921) (prominent Gilded Age corporate law treatise author advocating
state blue sky statutes). See also LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAWS (1958); Paul G.
Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses, 46 J. L. ECON. 229, 230232 (2003).
12
HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note __ at 75-76.
13
The construction of the marginal revenue curve is generally attributed to Joan Robinson, occasionally
with Edward H. Chamberlin as an independent discoverer. See Alfred S. Eichner, Joan Robinson’s
Legacy, 27 CHALLENGE 42 (1984). See JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION
182-196 (1933; 2d ed. 1969); EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
178-193 (1933).
14
George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. Pol. Econ. 1 (1957).
15
ROBINSON, supra; CHAMBERLIN, supra.
16
Joseph A. Schumpeter & A.J. Nichol, Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect Competition, 42 J. POL. ECON.
249, 250–251 (1934).
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circumstances under which governmental action could increase welfare “becomes so extended as
to make these cases the rule rather than more or less curious exceptions.”17
Inextricably related was the concept of uncertainty – and relatedly, risk – which developed
naturally out of theories that identified value with future expectations rather than past averages.18
A good example is the revolution in corporate finance.19 Under the classical theory any judge
who knew a little arithmetic and basic concepts of property valuation could decide whether stock
was “watered,” which meant that its stated par value exceeded the actual value historically paid
in.20 Answering that question required a judge to determine the amount of paid in cash and
noncash capital and divide by the number of shares. The biggest problem was overstatement of
the value of noncash property.21 But the marginalist theory that a firm’s value is a function of
anticipated profitability was far more complex, requiring considerable information about the firm
itself and its products and management, the market in which the firm operated, and the valuation
of uncertain future events.
The initial effect of marginalism was to weaken the classical view that nearly all markets
work well, and opinions about the robustness of markets differed a great deal depending on
assumptions about such things as the distribution of fixed and variable costs, the flow of
information, or the degree and nature of risk or uncertainty that the firm faced. This in turn led
increasingly to the view that markets differ from one another, and that many would work better if
the state applied a corrective. In other words, marginalism provided a rationale for both vastly
increased amount of government intervention in the economy and the idea that the type of
intervention should vary from one market to another. As with many revisionist ideas, its early
history reflected positions that were later thought to be extreme once marginalism became more
normalized in economic and regulatory theory.
Fixed Costs, Equilibrium, and Natural Monopoly
One of the most important issues confronting neoclassical regulatory theory was determining
the range of industries and firms to which price regulation should be applied. Policy makers
needed to know whether an industry equilibrium with satisfactory results could be achieved
without state intervention.
Among Alfred Marshall’s most significant contributions to neoclassical price theory was his
development of partial equilibrium analysis, which examined a portion of the economy limited to
a single “commodity” or finite time period. Marshall realized that in an economy everything
17

Id. at 256.
The most prophetic was FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921).
19
See discussion supra, text at notes __.
20
E.g., Appeal of Lehigh Ave. Rwy. Co., 499, 129 Pa. 405 (1889) (stock certificate “stands in the hands of
the subscriber for so much as, and no more than, the amount actually paid upon it”).
21
E.g., Gillett v Chicago Title & Trust Co., 230 Ill 373, 82 N.E. 891, 904-05 (1907) (promoters
contribution of an unwritten play and an unpatented invention not worth the $2 million evaluation placed
on them. Cf. Carr v. Le Fevre, 27 Pa. 413 (1856) (contribution of coal mining property at appraised value
permitted, given that there was no evidence suggesting that the appraisal was fraudulent).
18
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affects everything else. Nevertheless, he argued forcefully for the importance of studying a
specific product, assuming that changes in demand and supply for that product had no effect on
other goods. In defending this approach he wrote:
“The forces to be dealt with are, however, so numerous that it is best to analyse a few at a
time and to work out a number of partial solutions as auxiliaries to our main study. Thus we
begin by isolating the primary relations of supply, demand and price in regard to a particular
commodity. We reduce to inaction all other forces by the phrase ‘other things being equal’.
We do not suppose that they are inert, but for the time we ignore their activity. This scientific
device is a great deal older than science; it is the method by which consciously or
unconsciously sensible men dealt from time immemorial with every difficult problem of
everyday life.22
Famously, however, Marshall was unable to get an equilibrium in a competitive market if the
firms in it experienced significant fixed costs.23 Competition would drive prices to marginal
cost, which covers only variable costs. The firms in such a market would be forced to charge
prices so low that they could not stay in business.
One result of Marshall’s dilemma was that economists became embroiled in a significant
“fixed cost” controversy, in which economists and lawyers debated both the meaning and the
policy implications of high fixed costs.24 In antirust for example, firms argued that in industries
with high fixed costs competition would be “ruinous,” forcing firms out of business until only a
monopolist survived. Otherwise they would be forced to collude or merge.25 The economics
literature produced many studies involving long- vs. short-period sales, the availability of price
discrimination, or other theories attempting to explain how fixed costs could be consistent with
stable competition.26
The policy responses were less extreme than the literature. First, the Supreme Court
consistently rejected “ruinous competition” as a defense in antitrust cases.27 The principal
example of an industry that came under price regulation as a result of the controversy was the
railroads, where fixed costs were so high that they were thought to create natural monopolies
across a wide range of situations. The issue was also raised in the cast-iron pipe price fixing
case, but both the Sixth Circuit in Judge Taft’s well-known opinion and the Supreme Court

22

ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, preface, xiii (8th ed. 1920).
See, e.g., Renee Prendergast, Increasing Returns and Competitive Equilibrium – the Content and
Development of Marshall’s Theory, 16 CAMB. J. ECON. 238 (1992).
24
For an account of the debate in the United States and its affect on developing antitrust policy, see
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note __ at 308-322.
25
See, e.g., Eliot Jones, Is Competition in Industry Ruinous, 34 Q.J. ECON. 473 (1920) (summarizing the
theory of the day).
26
E.g., JOHN M. CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923); Spurgeon Bell, Fixed
Costs and Market Price, 32 Q.J. ECON. 507, 509–22 (1918); Frank H. Knight, Cost of Production and Price
over Long and Short Periods, 29 J. POL. ECON. 304, 306–10 (1921).
27
See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290, 329-330 (1897) (rejecting the
defense). Accord United States v. Joint-Traffic Assn., 171 U.S. 505, 519-523, 547-48, 569 (1898),
23
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rejected it there as well.28 There is some reason for believing that the Supreme Court’s hostility
toward cartels in high fixed cost industries either led to or exacerbated the first great American
merger movement, in which many firms with high fixed costs were forced to merge because
antitrust law left them unable to collude.29
Marshall’s own solution to the fixed cost problem was widely regarded as unacceptable.
Borrowing from biology, he reasoned that firms were like trees in a forest. The “representative
firm” went through a finite life cycle, growing in the earlier part, maturing, and eventually
withering away.30 As a result there would not be durable monopoly but rather ongoing cycling
of firms.31 Marshall wrote in his Eighth edition:
…the very conditions of an industry which enable a new firm to attain quickly command
over new economies of production, render that firm liable to be supplanted quickly by still
younger firms with yet newer methods. Especially where the powerful economies of
production on a large scale are associated with the use of new appliances and new methods, a
firm which has lost the exceptional energy which enable it to rise is likely ere long quickly to
decay; and the full life of a large firm seldom lasts very long.32
This passage indicates that Marshall was aware of the role of innovation (“newer methods’) in
upsetting equilibrium and perhaps even making the search for equilibrium less important. But
Marshall himself did not do down this road.33
One weakness in his biological theory of the life of a representative firm, Marshall
acknowledged, might be joint stock companies, or corporations, which did not necessarily go
through this ageing cycle. However, Marshall persisted in the view that such companies were
inherently inferior mechanisms of production, largely because of problems relating to the
separation of ownership and control.34
Most of Marshall’s intellectual descendants did not follow him into this biological forest.
Rather they looked for solutions to the fixed cost problem in two quite different places. Both
were driven more by the mathematics of marginalism rather than by biological analogies. First
28

United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899) (rejecting “ruinous competition” defense).
29
E.g., NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-1904 at
27-33 (1998). See also LESTER TELSER, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE CORE 387 (1978); George
Bittlingmayer, Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?, 28 J. L. & ECON. 77 (1985); George
Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost: a New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J. L. & ECON. 201
(1982).
30
See Gerald F. Shove, The Representative Firm and Increasing Returns, 40 ECON. J. 94 (1930).
31
For a good discussion, see Neil Hart, Marshall’s Theory of Value: the Role of External Economies, 20
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 353, 360-362 (1996).
32
ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 239 (8th ed. 1920).
33
That largely awaited Schumpeter. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY (1942), particularly its Chapter 7 on “The Process of Creative Destruction.”
34
Id. at 253 (shareholders generally unable “to exercise an effective and wise control over the general
management of the business”). See id. at 254-258 for Marshall’s highly suspicious account of
corporations, and particularly about the rise of the “trust” in the United States.
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was the idea that the long run average cost curve might be U-shaped rather than continuously
downward sloping. The second was the availability of product differentiation and, eventually,
monopolistic competition.
The proposition of U-shaped long run average cost is simply that scale economies do not
produce increasing returns indefinitely. Rather at some point the curve bottoms out and either
remains flat or begins to rise. In that case the equilibrium number of firms in a market with fixed
costs can be more than one, depending on the size of the market. For example, if average fixed
costs decline only to an output level of 1000 and market demand at that level is 10,000 units,
then this market has room for up to 10 technically efficient firms. This idea developed gradually
in writings by Marshall’s successor Arthur C. Pigou, and Francis Edgeworth, Piero Sraffa, Jacob
Viner, and others.35 Pigou in particular showed that when the supply price of the industry is
greater than the marginal cost of a firm, that firm would expand until these costs were equalized.
When a firm was in equilibrium, its marginal costs would equal the industry’s supply curve.
Firms could be expected to jockey for growth by competing to reduce costs.36
Of course, the fact that a U-shaped cost curve is possible does not mean that it explains every
situation. If the market is sufficiently small in relation to the availability of scale economies
there still might be room for only one firm. The other major development that addressed the
equilibrium problem was the idea that firms differ from one another in geographic37 and product
space. The development of the idea of product differentiation, and most particularly of
monopolistic competition theory in the 1930s, very largely ended the fixed cost controversy.38
Under monopolistic competition firms compete primarily not by cutting price but rather by
differentiating their product in order to appeal to specific consumer tastes. Edward Chamberlin
was able to show that even with easy entry and high fixed costs it was possible to have an
equilibrium if products were differentiated.39
The theory of monopolistic competition accomplished two things for regulatory policy. First,
it set people’s minds at ease that at least in the world of manufactured products rather than
commodities, ruinous competition and collusion or merger to monopoly were not inevitable.
Piero Sraffa, On the Relationships Between Cost and Quantity Produced (translated from French “Sulle
relazioni fra costo e quantità prodotta”), 11 ANNALI DE ECONOMIA 277 (1925); Piero Sraffa, The Laws of
Returns Under Competitive Conditions, 36 ECON. J. 535 (1926); ARTHUR C. PIGOU ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE (3d ed. 1929); Jacob Viner, Cost Curves and Supply Curves (1931), reprinted in READINGS IN
PRICE THEORY 23-46 (George J. Stigler and Kenneth E. Boulding, eds. 1953). See also Jan Horst
Keppler and Jerome Lallement, The Origins of the U-Shaped Average Cost Curve: Understanding the
Complexities of the Modern Theory of the Firm, 38 HIST. POL. ECON. 733 (2006). They identify the
earliest graphic depiction in Francis Y. Edgeworth, Contribution to the Theory of Railway Rates – IV, 23
ECON. J. 206 (1913).
36
Arthur C. Pigou, An Analysis of Supply, 38 ECON. J. 238 (1928). See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase,
Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499 (2011).
37
On differentiation in geographic space, see Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41
(1929).
38
See BLAUG, supra note __, 375-379.
39
E.g., John R. Hicks, Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3 ECONOMETRICA 1 (1935);
Arthur Smithies, Equilibrium in Monopolistic Competition, 55 Q.J. ECON. 95 (1940).
35
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Rather, this became a problem of degree. Second, however, was the realization that
monopolistic competition was not so perfect either. Prices were higher than marginal cost.
Further, firms under monopolistic competition dedicated considerable resources toward product
differentiation, leading to the view that product differentiation was “excessive.” This led to
discussions of such topics as whether annual style changes in the automobile industry should be
regarded as an unfair method of competition.40 Relatedly, the intellectual property laws were
thought to be harmful to the extent that they facilitated such differentiation. The decades
following the New Deal were characterized by a rapid expansion of antitrust policy accompanied
by considerable hostility toward intellectual property rights, most notably patents and
trademarks.41
In any event, the ruinous competition problem itself became largely relegated to common
carriers such as the railroads, public utilities, and other transport firms. It has reappeared from
time to time in antitrust price fixing case law, but only to be rejected. The most recent is the
Apple eBooks decision, which rejected the publishers’ argument that ruinous competition in
electronic books justified their collective agreement to raise prices and impose these on
Amazon.42
One important but overhyped idea that originated in the 1960s and 1970s was that even
natural monopoly franchises could operate competitively if competition were seen as being “for”
rather than “in” the market. Even if a market has room for only one seller at a time, competition
to be that seller might keep prices at the competitive level without regulation. The basic theory
had already shown up in various “potential competition” antitrust cases.43 It was also implicit in
the common law of requirements contracts. For example, a store owner might prefer to have one
person plow snow on an as needed basis over the course of a season, rather than taking bids for
each snowstorm. Courts had approved such contract since the Gilded Age.44 Even though there
is only one snow plower over the year, the price is competitive because prospective sellers must
bid and rebid for that contract, or franchise.
Harold Demsetz famously queried, why could not the same principle apply to public
utilities?45 Of course, the snow plower has assets such as a truck that can readily be moved from
40

E.g., FTC, Report on the Motor Vehicle Industry (1939). The issues are summarized in Note, Annual
Style Change in the Automobile Industry as an Unfair Method of Competition, 80 Yale L.J 567 (1971). In
its main brief to the Supreme Court in the Brown Shoe Merger Case, the government argued that rapid
style changes in the shoe industry made it very difficult for smaller shoe manufacturers to compete. Brief
for the United States, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States (Nov. 15, 1961), 1961 WL 101890.
41
See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note __, at 198-200, 227-228, 288-289.
42
United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 333 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016); see
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Design of Production, 103 CORNELL L. REV. ___ (2018)
(forthcoming), available at file:///C:/Users/sherm/Downloads/SSRN-id3013122. See also Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Information Technologies, 68 FLA. L. REV. 419, 438-40 (2016).
43
See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) (two firms bidding to
wholesale natural gas to Los Angeles should be regarded as competitors for merger purposes, even though
only one of them had made any sales there).
44
See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note __ at 126-129.
45
See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968).
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one site to another, permitting the market for plowing snow on a particular parking lot to be very
competitive, provided that the prospective snow plowers behave competitively. As soon as one
begins to speak about utilities that have durable and nonmoveable installations, such as power,
cable, or gas lines, the problem becomes much more complex. The winner of the first round
would have a significant bidding advantage over any prospective entrant who would have to
install the system. Alternatively, some mechanism might be established for transferring the
system from the incumbent to the new winner, or perhaps a government such as a state or
municipality could own the system, with successive firms simply agreeing to be its operators.46
William Baumol, one of the most optimistic of contestable market proponents, proclaimed it
to be “an uprising of in the Theory of Industry Structure.”47 To be sure, the theory of contestable
markets was an important contribution to regulatory theory. However, as a policy matter it never
lived up to expectations. Much of the technical theory turned into a discussion of cost
classification – mainly, which costs were variable, which were fixed, and which were “sunk.”
The later type was crucial. Even a high fixed cost need not interfere with contestability if the
asset in question, such as the snow plowing truck, is readily and costless transferrable from one
market to another. For obvious reasons, much of the theory focused on the airline industry:
although aircraft are costly and durable, if they can easily be transferred from one market to
another in response to diverging prices the result should be competition. But this theory of “hit
and run” entry largely overlooked details such as the very substantial cost of airports, gate space
leases, and other items that were not so readily transferable.48 Institutions, it seems, always get in
the way. The effect of deregulation of airlines has not been contestability, but rather imperfect
competition or oligopoly among competitors, with frequent claims of price fixing. The literature
generally shows an inverse correlation between price and the number of carriers on a route –
which is inconsistent with contestability but quite consistent with oligopoly or collusion.49 From
a consumer welfare perspective, price competition among competing carriers is very likely much
superior to the previous regime of price regulation by the now defunct Civil Aeronautics Board,
but it is a far cry from contestability.
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Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies—in general and with Respect to
CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976).
47
William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 AM.
ECON. REV. 1 (1982). The theory was expanded and later published in WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C.
PANZAR, & ROBERT D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
(1988).
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See General Accounting Office, Airline Competition: Effects of Airline Market Concentration and
Barriers to Entry on Airfares (April 1991), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/220/214117.pdf
(under deregulation airline markets still exhibit higher prices as they become more concentrated,
indicating lack of contestability).
49
See, e.g., Federico Ciliberto, Eddie Watkins, and Jonathan W. Williams, Two Screening Tests for Tacit
Collusion: Evidence from the Airline Industry (July 29, 2017), available at
https://www.gao.gov/assets/220/214117.pdf;
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Cost Classification, Incentives, and Return-based Ratemaking.
Under marginalism, the principal rationale for rate regulation moved from a focus on
“public service” to one that focused on the nature of costs. The historical rationale for rate
regulation had been that certain firms were “affected with the publick interest,” in the words of
Justice Matthew Hale, because of their strategic location. He made that argument in reference to
strategically located seaports which held effective monopolies in their service area.50 The United
States Supreme Court adopted it to uphold state price regulation of grain elevators strategically
located along railroad tracks.51 Blackstone’s justification for regulation used the term
“prerogatives of the Crown” as opposed to “common callings.”52 Anyone could engage in a
common calling, but only the Crown could authorize someone to exercise one of its prerogatives,
which became the subject of exclusive grants.53
What distinguished these special firms was both that they were essential gateways to
commerce and that competition was not believed to be possible because the market terrain,
whether physical or economic, permitted only one firm. Under marginalism, this rationale
shifted to the one developed in the previous section – namely, that the firms were natural
monopolies, typically with very high fixed costs. As a result, the market itself would produce
either ruinous competition or monopoly. More technically, the long run average cost curved
sloped downward continuously for such a distance that the optimal number of sustainable firms
in a market was one. That fact provided a rationale for price regulation, leaving the question of
how to select the proper price.
This neoclassical definition was significantly narrower than the common law
classification scheme, which had historically recognized regulated monopoly status for things
that were almost certainly not natural monopolies, but merely sellers that were regarded as
deserving protection from “excessive” competition. For example, according to Blackstone, at
common law a retail market authorized by the local Lord was entitled to protection from
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Sir Matthew Hale, De Portibus Maris, in A TREATISE IN THREE PARTS (c. 1670), reprinted in 1 A
COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 45 (F. Hargrave ed. 1787).
51
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876), quoting de Portibus Maris:
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or lade their goods as for the purpose, because they are the wharfs only licensed by the queen, . . .
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See William Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 355
(1954); Barry E Hawk, English Competition Law Before 1900, __ ANTITRUST BULL. __ (2018)
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competition for a seven-mile radius from its location, which was one third of a day’s journey.54
As late as 1827 the Court of King’s Bench held it unlawful for the defendant to sell fish from his
house within the specified distance from an authorized local market.55 New York Chancellor
Kent opined in an 1812 decision involving a state issued steamboat patent that the government
prerogative to grant exclusive charters for “beneficial public purposes” was clear and that “all
our bank charters, turnpike, canal and bridge companies, ferries, markets, etc, are grants of
exclusive privileges….” He also acknowledged that the extent of these grants might be
“inexpedient or unwise,” but that did not undermine the state’s power to grant them.56 His list
included some things that could have been natural monopolies (canals and bridges) but others
(banks and markets) that almost certainly were not.
Exclusive grants to public service companies in the United States frequently came along
with price regulation. Prior to the Gilded Age, however, the prices were typically stipulated in
the grantee’s charter rather than applied by legislation.57 In its 1837 Charles River Bridge
decision the plaintiff argued that government-mandated spatial separation of toll bridges was
necessary in order to prevent ruinous competition between them.58 The plaintiff’s charter also
stipulated the tolls that it could charge to those crossing the bridge.59 These two elements of the
modern public utility – a monopoly grant and regulated rates –were thus in place long prior to
the marginalist revolution.60 The Supreme Court approved statutory price regulation in principle
in Munn v. Illinois, although it did not consider whether the Constitution required any
limitations.61 In Munn there was no charter in which rates could be specified, because Munn &
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Scott was a common law partnership.62 In the Spring Valley Water case in 1884 the Supreme
Court again approved statutory rate regulation, in this case of water rates by a privately operated
water works.63 The statute required that water rates be “reasonable,” and created a commission
to determine reasonableness.64 In approving this procedure, however, the court stated that it was
reserving judgment on the possibility that such a commission might set a ‘manifestly
unreasonable” rate.65 Finally, in 1898 the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited a state from imposing a railroad rate that generated less than “fair value” on the
railroad’s property.66
While the Interstate Commerce Commission had been created in 1887, it did not have full
authority to set rates, preempting state law, until 1920.67 Pending that, most rate regulation
befell the states. The statutory or administrative setting of rates in price regulated industries had
always involved some kind of notion that rates must be “above cost,” sufficient to give the
regulated firm a reasonable rate of return.
What marginalist price theory provided was a cost classification system for establishing
the Constitution’s minimum standard of reasonableness. Aside from sporadic attempts to
regulate commodity prices, price regulation prior to the Civil War was largely ad hoc, negotiated
on an individual firm basis. By contrast, neoclassical price theory sorted industries by cost
structure. In 1887, the same year that the Interstate Commerce Act was passed, Henry Carter
Adams wrote an important article classifying industries into three groups: those with decreasing
returns to scale, those with constant returns to scale, and those with increasing returns to scale.
For industries in the third classification, he argued, competition could not be relied on to make
firms perform well. Firms with higher output would have lower costs than smaller ones, leading
to a monopoly unless they were constrained. Adams’ principal example was the railroads.68
Much of the early neoclassical theory of cost-based price regulation developed in debates
over the proper treatment of railroads, an industry that was tailor-made for study of the
marginalist economics of costs. The railroads had very high fixed costs for land, track networks,
and equipment, but also significant variable, or operating costs, including fuel and labor. The
market appeared not to do a very good job of providing the conditions for competitive
equilibrium. If a line was too isolated its owners would earn monopoly returns. State officials
often responded by chartering additional railroads, resulting in significant overbuilding and
See Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 569 (1886) (“the case of Munn v. Illinois was
selected by the court as the most appropriate one in which to give its opinions on that subject; because
that case presented the question of a private citizen, or unincorporated partnership”).
63
Spring Valley Water-Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347 (1884).
64
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Walk?, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1116 (1942). For a contemporary defense of agency rate regulation, see
Adelbert Moot, Railway Rate Regulation, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 487 (1906).
67
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of 1920).
68
Henry C. Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, 1 PUB. AM. ECON. ASSN. 7 (1887).
62

Hovenkamp

Marginalism and Regulation

June 2018, Page 14

complaints about “ruinous competition” already in the 1890s.69 Because most shipping services
were fungible, excess capacity tended to drive rates to marginal cost, without enough remaining
to amortize fixed costs. In this atmosphere it is no wonder that several economists and legal
writers advocated “pooling,” which was essentially cartelization, of competing railroads.70
Indeed, the Interstate Commerce Commission had approved the very rate setting pool that the
Supreme Court condemned in its first antitrust decision on the merits, the Trans-Missouri case in
1897.71
While collusion would protect the railroads from ruinous competition, it would not
protect customers, however. A railroad cartel would charge its profit-mazimizing price just as a
single firm monopolist would, not the minimum price needed to sustain investment in the
industry. In the 1880s Gilded Age scholars of railway regulation such as eventual Yale president
Arthur Twining Hadley embarked on a serious economic analysis of railroad costs and pricing.72
Already by this time, railroad operators and economists understood that paying off fixed cost
debt required keeping output high, and that this would be facilitated by permitting price
discrimination. Hadley showed how bringing in incremental freight at a lower rate served to
reduce overall costs, provided that the rate was greater than incremental operating costs.73
Hadley was already closing in on a fundamental conception of mid-twentieth century rate
regulation:74 absent capacity constraints the optimal rate brings in every set of customers at the
highest rate that class is willing to pay, thus maximizing output. But of course, that was price
discrimination which could be trusted to produce loud complaints from those required to pay the
higher prices.
The need to price discriminate in order to keep output up led to rate classification rules
that seem hysterically complicated and fundamentally unfair to outside observers, although their
purpose was clear: any freight rate sufficient to cover the variable costs of shipment would make
a positive contribution to net revenue. By bringing in every such customer at the highest price
they were willing to pay, the railroad maximized its net revenue and could divide its fixed costs
over a larger number of sales. Offsetting this, of course, would be the administrative cost of
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developing so many classifications, including disputing classification costs with unhappy
customers or their rivals.75 These solutions, extended to other public utilities, produced much of
the modern neoclassical economics of industrial organization and price theory, including thirddegree price discrimination. For example, the Ramsey pricing solution discussed below
contemplated very elaborate rate classifications, literally assessing a rate equal to each individual
customer’s willingness to pay.76
Once marginalism led to classification of costs as fixed, variable, and marginal, the basic
theory of rate regulation became simple enough. The devil was in the details. The regulated
utility, transportation, or other firm is entitled to a fair rate of return on its fixed cost investment,
plus “pass through” of its variable costs. This has come to be called “rate of return” regulation
or “cost of service” ratemaking.77 It has been widely used for a century, but also widely
criticized, mainly for providing insufficient incentives for firms to innovate or reduce costs.78 It
also produced a lengthy Constitutional debate about the rate base – namely, whether the firm’s
return should be based on replacement cost of worn out plant and equipment, or whether it was
enough that the firm receive a positive return on its actual historical investment, which was
typically much lower.79 During the Substantive Due Process Era the Supreme Court had insisted
on “fair value” and this was generally interpreted by contemporaries as replacement cost. 80 The
Court’s formulation of the requirements in Smyth v. Ames was:
in order to ascertain that [fair] value, the original cost of construction, the amount
expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and
stock, the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning
75
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capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required
to meet operating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and are to be given such
weight as may be just and right in each case. We do not say that there may not be other
matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the property.81
Finally in its Hope Natural Gas decision (1944), the Supreme Court upheld a rate based on
historical cost as the Constitutional minimum.82
Two of the most serious criticisms of rate of return regulation are, first, that the basic
formulation leads to inefficient pricing to the extent that pass through of variable costs is not a
sufficiently close approximation of marginal cost. Second, the administration of cost-of-service
ratemaking takes away firms’ incentives to innovate and reduce costs.
On the first. Cost of service rate making is not a close approximation to marginal cost
pricing. A single price equal to marginal cost would be far too low for most public utilities
because it would not compensate the utility for its fixed costs. But how should fixed costs be
allocated? The Ramsey solution, which was intended to maximize output and thus reduce the
impact of fixed costs, was to price to each customer at the inverse of that customer’s elasticity of
demand.83 While Ramsey formalized this solution in the 1920s and it bears his name, railroads
had already been doing a rather nontechnical version of this for decades, as Arthur Twining
Hadley’s 1885 book on railroad rates had elaborated. Regulators understood that the key to
profitability was to maximize output on the existing fixed cost network. Any shipper willing to
pay more than running expenses was profitable in the short run. At the same time, however,
someone had to amortize fixed costs. As a result, the elaborate railroad rate classification
schemes made rates for lower value goods such as coal or cement that were far below the rates
charged for higher value finished goods. They also charged significantly higher prices per mile
for short hauls than for long hauls.84 The rationale for that phenomenon is readily apparent to
anyone who looks at a map of the American railroad network. Often there was only one railroad
between two fairly nearby towns. However, as the dropping and pickup points became further
apart the network provided more alternatives, making it possible for more railroads to compete
for the same shipment. That is, the amount of competition in the market increased as the
distance between the two shipping points increased.85
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One idea intended to make regulated pricing resemble market pricing more closely was
Ronald Coase’s suggestion of two part pricing, which roughly segregated the fixed and variable
cost components, permitting marginal cost pricing of the latter.86 Coase argued that every
customer could be required to pay an access fee which was fixed, in the sense that it did not vary
with the number of units that the customer used. This fee would be calculated so as to cover the
fixed cost components of public utility costs. Then each customer’s actual use would be priced
out at marginal cost.
Coase’s article had actually been written as a response to Harold Hotelling’s far more
interventionist approach, which was to require the government to pay the fixed cost proportion of
transportations and utilities by providing the infrastructure, and then charging customers the
marginal cost of operation.87 Hotelling’s argument was highly praised by prominent public
utility scholars such as James Bonbright.88 Coase, who was always fierce in searching out
private alternatives, sought one that would minimize government control. Without getting too
deeply into the weeds, it is worth noting that this debate, which occurred in the 1930s and 1940s,
reveals how central marginalist conceptions had become in economic thinking about regulated
pricing, even among those who advocated for a high degree of public ownership.
The second development, which was to have a major impact on the deregulation
movement, was Averch’s and Johnson’s theory of gold-plating.89 Economically, the “AverchJohnson effect” operates as a severe qualification on Coase’s “The Nature of the Firm” when the
firm is in a price-regulated environment.90 Coase actually conceived of his own article as a first
attempt to apply marginalist economics to questions about the optimal size and shape of a
business firm. He opened his paper with praise for Marshall:
It is hoped to show … that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only
realistic … but tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis
developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the
idea of substitution at the margin.91
Coase argued that the firm, driven entirely by the need to maximize its profits,
relentlessly compares the marginal cost of doing something internally against the marginal cost
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of procurement from outside, choosing whichever produces the largest payoff. As a result, the
firm’s structure is “efficient” to the extent that the markets in which it purchases are efficient.92
But suppose the firm is guaranteed a profitable price, equal to or slightly above marginal
cost, on all of its durable procurements. The firm will have an incentive to perform activities
internally rather than through purchase on the market, even though the latter is the better choice
in a competitive market. The firm would have an incentive to integrate vertically or to expand
into other markets that would not exist absent regulation. To the extent that it gets its rate of
return on its capital investment and is limited to pass through of costs for variable cost items
such as labor, it has an incentive to invest relatively more in capital assets. As a result, regulated
firms tend to be excessively capital intensive when compared with the unregulated market.93
Perhaps more ominously, the regulated firm would have an incentive to build unneeded
infrastructure, knowing that it would be guaranteed a profitable rate of return.94 By contrast, a
competitive firm would enlarge its plant only if anticipated receipts, determined entirely by the
market, exceeded anticipated costs.
The Averch-Johnson literature produced interesting collateral issues, such as the
regulated utility’s right to recover for its “stranded” costs, which are costs incurred in
enlargement of infrastructure that later turned out to be unnecessary or unwise. 95 In some cases
this happened because of policy changes that made a previous investment, such as a coal-fired
plant or hospital’s certificate of need,96 improvident. Importantly, however, firms acting under
regulation often propose capital investments to a regulator, and Averch-Johnson suggests this
can happen even if those investments would have been inefficient in a competitive market. Then
later, when the regulator comes to its senses or the increased demand that the regulated utility
promised do not materialize, the regulator withdraws its authorization. This might leave a
partially built or recently on line plant “stranded,” in the sense that it is no longer needed. The
firm may then claim that the regulatory approval and its subsequent retraction is an improper
taking of its property without compensation.97
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No matter how one feels about Averch-Johnson, one thing that emerges clearly is that
cost-of-service rate making is not the best way to determine price and output in any market
where competition is viable. As a result, price regulated markets must be pared down so that
price and output actually be regulated only in those portions of the market where competition
seems not to work. This has been one of the principal consequences of the deregulation
movement discussed below.98
The Changing Domain of Market Failure: Regulation and Public Choice
The marginalist revolution gave the United States the “mixed” economy that it has
today. Under marginalism, markets are not as robust as pre-marginalists believed, but they
remain the dominant means by which resources move around. The most important economic
policy function of government today is identification of markets that work well when left
relatively untended and those that do not, and then coming up with the correct prescription for
those in the latter group.
99

This makes the concept of “market failure” central to modern public decision making. In
the political economy of regulation, the term has more than a single meaning. The dominant
definition within neoclassical economics relates to the inability of a market to reach an
equilibrium on its own, or otherwise to reach only equilibria that exhibit unsatisfactory output
and prices.100 As an example of the latter, when entry is impossible monopoly may be a stable
equilibrium, but one in which price and output are suboptimal.
Under the strictest definition, static market failure is any durable deviation from marginal
cost pricing. Of course, dynamic factors such as innovation may simultaneously increase the
innovator’s price-cost margins while also increasing output or welfare, at least in the long run.101
For example, one of the longest-standing responses to market failure is the intellectual property
system, which involves government creation of exclusive rights to facilitate limited periods of
high price-cost margins as an inducement to innovation. In any event, market failure is often
defined in ways that do not use Pareto efficiency or perfect competition as a baseline – for
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example, one can speak of it as “the failure of the market to bring about results that are in the
best interests of society as a whole.”102
The technical neoclassical definition of market failure generally excludes purely
distributive factors. Of course, sometimes income inequality can lead to market failure,
particularly when inequality makes it more costly for poorer people to move into more
productive occupations,103 or when lack of competitive pressure on certain groups induces them
to be less productive.104 To the extent maldistribution of wealth impairs productivity, and thus
output, it can be a market failure even under a strictly neoclassical definition.
The classical political economists had strong faith in markets. To be sure, there were
some qualifications, such as Thomas Malthus population argument that the market would
invariably force the population to subsistence levels,105 Ricardo’s concerns with monopoly in
land rents,106 or perhaps most famously John Stuart Mill’s discussion of natural monopoly and
the British postal system or lines for gas lighting.107 But for the most part the classical political
economists regarded these as rare exceptions to the general theory of markets. That was even
truer of classical political economy in the United States, where an abundance of undeveloped
land was widely seen as making the concerns expressed by Ricardo and Malthus relatively
unimportant.108 Increasingly after the Jackson era, American legislatures and courts trusted
markets to allocate resources properly. Some states even invalidated monopoly rights for rather
clear natural monopoly industries, such as gas lighting.109
A common characteristic of the bridges, toll roads, canals, and railroads that received
monopoly charters is that they required a significant fixed cost investment and in most cases one
installation would be adequate to handle all of the traffic.110 As a result, they were true natural
monopolies. Competition would drive prices to marginal cost without enough remaining to cover
fixed costs. Indeed, in the Charles River Bridge case the plaintiffs raised the “ruinous

102

Alain Marciano and Steven G. Medema, Introduction: Market Failure in Context, 47 HIST. POL. ECON,
1 (2015).
103
See, e.g., Kim A. Weeden and David B. Grusky, Inequality and Market Failure, 38 AMERICAN
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 473 (2013).
104
For example, if it could be shown that a tax and transfer system that levelled income also increased
productivity, then this would be a correction of a market failure in the neoclassical sense.
105
THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS, ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (1798).
106
DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1817).
107
JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 143 (1848).
108
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 421431 (1988), summarizing how nineteenth century American political economists believed that the vast
amounts of undeveloped land in the United States established that the threats offered by Malthus and
Ricardo would occur in the distant future, if at all.
109
E.g., Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19 (1856) (invalidating monopoly
grants for a gas light utility granted by both the state and the local government, and permitting second
firm to install competing lines).
110
See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, 105-169, 199-206.

Hovenkamp

Marginalism and Regulation

June 2018, Page 21

competition” defense sixty years before it came into use in railroad cases.111 Tolls decreased by
half to two-thirds upon the opening of the competing Warren Bridge.112 By the time the case
reached the Supreme Court the Charles River Bridge had already closed. It would reopen in
1841 when the Commonwealth turned it into a free bridge.113
At least for a time, the marginalist revolution very largely brought the classicists’ robust
faith in markets to an end – a view undoubtedly aided by World War I and the Depression. The
concerns about fixed costs and failure of equilibrium discussed previously114 were one
significant manifestation, but there were others. The dramatic rise of antitrust was driven by the
belief that even markets that are not natural monopolies can fail. Indeed, the extent to which
antitrust was brought to bear in nonmonopolized markets is striking. After the New Deal
Antitrust became a vehicle for controlling manufacturer-created distribution systems in
competitively structured markets,115 as well as controlling price differences between competing
dealers,116 and for limiting the effects of product differentiation. Underlying this was a fear of
vertical integration that, at least as a matter of economics, can only be described as hysterical. 117
Increasingly after the mid-twentieth century, regulatory theory embraced a renewed
neoclassicism that once again saw markets as robust, although not as robust as they were
perceived by the classicists. Coasean thinking strongly emphasized market solutions, even in
markets that did not meet the requirements for perfect competition. Indeed, the Coase Theorem
itself focused on bargaining in bilateral monopolies.118 Entitlements such as communications
spectrum119 or the right to pollute became tradeable and the scope of market failure declined to
near non-existence. In the Coasean vision even the lighthouse, frequently given as an example
of resistance to free market supply, became freed from government control.120
Worse yet, the rise of modern public choice theory in the 1960s turned interest group
capture rather than market failure into the positive rationale for regulation. Writers like
Buchanan and Tullock began with perfect competition as the baseline, and then sought to explain
how democratic political voting produced harmful deviations.121 Mancur Olson’s much more
popular but equally devastating Logic of Collective Action also began with competitive markets
111
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as a baseline and then tried to explain regulatory deviations as political oligopolies or cartels that
enriched their organizers at the expense of society.122 Ironically, Olson borrowed his regulatory
oligopoly theory straight from Edward Chamberlin, who had been his dissertation director.123
Under the Stigler-Posner-Pelzman model of regulation, its roots lay in political bargaining
among special interests rather than in anything having much to do with neoclassical price theory
or industrial organization theory.124 Interest group capture became the dominant explanation
device for regulation.125
Ironically, theories of interest group capture actually entered American politico-economic
discourse from the left, through writers such as Charles Beard and Gabriel Kolko. Beard argued
during the Progressive Era that the Constitution was largely a product of capture by urban
owners of personal property over much more populous but widely dispersed agrarian interests.126
Kolko, a Marxist, argued in the 1960s that Gilded Age railroad regulation really occurred at the
behest of the railroads themselves, who wanted regulation in order to shelter themselves from
competition.127 After that, regulatory capture theory moved rightward.128
Today we seem to have reached a balance in regulatory theory in which a combination of
traditional price and organization economics and public choice theory are called upon as the best
positive explainers of regulatory policy. In a democratic society, to see regulation as nothing
more than the consequence of market structure or cost characteristics is naïve, but so is seeing it
as nothing more than the outcome of fights among competing interest groups. For example,
today in the great majority of states groceries, clothing, and automobiles are sold in markets that
are more or less competitive, with price set predominantly through voluntary transactions. By
contrast, retail electricity and natural gas are sold through regulated monopolies. Few would
seriously argue that this is because electric power lobbyists have more clout than those who work
in the food and agricultural markets.
To be sure, interest group theory may explain much of the details of regulatory policy.
As noted below, the deregulation movement has done a great service by distinguishing those
attributes of the economy that are best left to the market from those that require more
122

MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965).
123
See Hovenkamp, Opening, supra note __ at 313-314.
124
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971);
Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975); Richard
A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22 (1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory
of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY:
MICROECONOMICS 1 (1989); Sam Peltzman, An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional
Voting in the Twentieth Century, 75 AM ECON. REV. 656 (1985).
125
E.g., THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY (Claudia
Goldin & Gary D. Libecap, eds., 1994).
126
CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1913)
127
GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (1965).
128
See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note __ at 308-314.

Hovenkamp

Marginalism and Regulation

June 2018, Page 23

governmental decision making.129 In the process, however, the deregulation movement faces
abundant criticism from those who think it has gone too far on the one side, and those who think
that it has not gone far enough on the other.
Market Diversity and Agency Sector regulation
Market diversity and market failure go hand in hand. Markets are like Tolstoy’s families.
Happy families are all pretty much alike, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. 130
When markets work well they require relatively little government attention other than the rules
of property and contract, which are very largely common to all. But they fail for reasons that are
typically quite specific. Even natural monopolies, while exhibiting a common set of
characteristics, have unique features and information requirements that operate on the regulator.
An important consequence of the marginalist revolution was the idea that markets differ
from one another, particularly when they fail. As a result, they were thought to require different
regulatory fixes. This thesis flowed from two things. First the cost classifications that occupied
marginalists, including the emergent theory of regulated monopoly, not only made price and
output analysis more complex, it also revealed that while firms within the same market and using
the same technology often were more-or-less the same, the firms in one market could have cost
structures that were quite different from those in another market. Further, the relationship
between fixed costs and market size varied enormously. A relatively small railroad operating
within a single state might require price regulation, while giant petroleum or steel refiners might
be made to operate differently. Large markets tended to require larger regulators – most notably
the federal government if they spilled over more than a single state. Small markets were best
controlled by smaller regulators – namely, the states and governmental subdivisions. The
diversity was not merely geographic, however. It was also production or technology specific.
For example, the cost classification problems that might show up in electric power generation
differed from those for natural gas production or telecommunications. Agencies with unique and
exclusive jurisdictions were in large part a response to this perception of market diversity,
replacing a nineteenth century conception in which most “regulating” was carried on by courts of
general jurisdiction.
The other problem leading to agency regulation was risk management.131 Once again,
however, the nature and technical features of the relevant risks could vary widely from one
technology or product to another. Classical valuations that depended on the past did not take risk
into account because relevant risks were already encountered and included in the calculus. But
risk became a significant – indeed, in some cases overwhelming – part of valuation and
optimization within the marginalist framework. This is particularly true of activities that produce
numerous spillovers or other situations where the market itself or the common law cannot force
people to internalize the social harm their activities cause.
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Deregulation
The deregulation movement forced reexamination of many issues in the debate over
neoclassical market theory and the rationales for government intervention. The movement began
in government policy during the waning years of the Carter administration and accelerated
during the 1980s.132 The initial impact of deregulation has been substantial. By one measure,
industries characterized by “full” regulation of price and entry produced about 17 percent of the
GNP in 1977, but about 6.6 percent in 1988.133 The deregulation movement was significantly a
reaction to excesses in the granting of monopoly status and needless rate-of-return price
regulation. Then Professor Stephen Breyer’s 1984 book, Regulation and its Reform, pointed out
how legal entry restrictions and price regulation were imposed in industries such as trucking that
were competitively structured or at least capable of being so.134
At the theoretical level the deregulation movement was a response to several
developments. An important one was changes in technology.135 For example, thanks to the
development of wireless and advanced switching capabilities, the justifications for a single
natural monopoly telephone system disappeared. The real instigators were wireless firms such as
MCI and Sprint who convinced courts and the FCC to upset AT&T strenuously defended
dominance.136 More theoretically, it became clear that regulation could be a very costly
enterprise in relation to any benefits that it produced. One well known early example of this
critique is the evolution of James Landis, Chairman of the SEC during the New Deal. In
writings a generation apart Landis initially lauded regulation as the savior of the economy,137 but
later lamented that it had not come close to satisfying expectations.138
However, most of the low hanging fruit has already been picked. Further deregulation
may threaten the environmental, health, or safety by amounts considerably greater than the cost
savings themselves, depending on the industry.139 That is more likely to be the case as a greater
amount of regulation is made subject to mandatory cost-benefit analysis, and as the
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methodologies of CBA have improved. If a regulation was fully and accurately evaluated under
CBA, then removing it by implication will cause more harm than good.
Contestability theory, which was widely touted as opening the path toward broad
deregulation,140 has actually had much less to do with implementing deregulation than have more
fundamental concerns about the values of incumbent competition and the economic inefficiency
of regulation, particularly those expressed in the Averch-Johnson literature.141 For the most part,
when deregulation has moved markets from regulated monopoly to some sort of competition the
competition that emerged has been among incumbent firms, not monopoly incumbents who vied
with one another for the right to occupy that position. In other words, the Williamson analysis of
contestability, emphasizing the difficulties in the presence of costly and durable infrastructure,
has been much more influential on actual policy than the Demsetz analysis.142 The exceptions
have tended to occur in situations where the production facility, network or grid is already in
place and the market proceeds by competitive bids for single suppliers during a defined time
period.
The greatest focus of deregulation has been on situations where competition among
actual incumbents is possible and markets or political institutions can be designed in a way that
will accommodate them. The earliest targets for deregulation, which included trucking and
passenger airlines, certainly fell into that category. More networked industries eventually
followed. For example, the dramatic increases in the amount of competition that have occurred
in telecommunications since the 1982 antitrust consent decree143 and the 1996
Telecommunications Act144 have largely been increases in competition among multiple
incumbent firms. Contestability theory has not had a significant role. AT&T’s divestiture of
Western Electric led to a fiercely competitive market for devices.145 For a lengthy period local
telephony operated as a price-regulated monopoly, while long distance provision was
competitively structured.146 Today even local service is competitive, although the competition is
typically between the resident ILEC147 and one or more cable or other internet service providers
that sell VOIP148 or perhaps a different technology. Looking at the economy as a whole, true
contestability, where a single firm is the current seller in a market with significant infrastructure
but must re-bid for that right, is a relative rarity.
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The other thing that has accompanied deregulation is a counterbalancing increase in the
use of antitrust law.149 For example, under comprehensive regulation industries such as the
airlines were once regarded as virtually immune from antitrust scrutiny,150 but hardly today.
Substantially, this is the result of a paradigm shift in the theory of regulation, away from the
control of markets and toward the control of practices. In most cases of deregulation, regulators
do not simply exit from a market. Rather, they apply regulatory tools more selectively. During
the 1960s we tended to think of federal agency regulation as “pervasive,” in the sense that it left
little discretion over pricing and exclusionary practices to the individual firm, and when these
occurred they were usually placed within the jurisdiction of the regulatory agency.151 Today,
however, we view regulation as more “transactional,” in that it applies to a particular practice
rather than an entire industry. When a specific transaction is within the jurisdiction of the
agency and the agency is actually overseeing it, then antitrust has no role to play. But antitrust
can be brought to bear in those areas that the regulators do not tend.152 This hybrid approach is
particularly descriptive of telecommunications, the airlines, healthcare, and to a lesser extent
energy.
Wealth Distribution
The issues swirling around regulation and wealth distribution tend to focus on two
concerns. The first is whether government control should be used to redistribute wealth for its
own sake, simply because we regard certain distributions as unfair or we think social welfare is
greater by some measure as wealth is more evenly distributed. The other is whether
maldistribution of wealth affects productivity, and thus redistribution may spur economic
growth. The latter one falls within modern neoclassical concerns about regulation. Under most
conceptions of economic welfare, the former one does not.
For the first two generations of marginalists, concerns about the distribution of wealth in
the economy were paramount. Further, since most did not expect that maldistribution of wealth
would right itself through ordinary market forces, some kind of government intervention was
thought necessary.
The early marginalists believed in declining marginal utility, but also in the policy value
of interpersonal utility comparisons. All things equal, a more even distribution of wealth
produced greater welfare. Individuals were thought to experience declining marginal utility for
any good, including wealth, as they have more. The leap the early marginalists were willing to
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make was that this attribute applied across persons as well as to a single individual. For
example, Marshall wrote in the third edition of Principles that “[A] pound's worth of satisfaction
to an ordinary poor man is a much greater thing than a pound's worth of satisfaction to an
ordinary rich man.”153 Marshall’s successor at Cambridge, Arthur C. Pigou, followed: a
“transference of income from a relatively rich man to a relatively poor man of similar
temperament, since it enables more intense wants to be satisfied at the expense of less intense
wants, must increase the aggregate sum of satisfaction.”154 Many early American marginalists
agreed. For example, Chicago economist Jacob Viner acknowledged in 1925 that “Changes in
the relative distribution of income as between different classes will bring about changes in the
amount of welfare, even though the aggregate real income of the community remains the
same.”155 Within this framework a social welfare scheme that transferred wealth away from the
wealthy and toward the poor increased aggregate welfare to the extent that the wealthy
experienced less welfare from a given sum of money than the poor did.
In the mid-thirties Lord Lionel Robbins exploded this argument in his Essay on the
Nature and Significance of Economic Science. He argued that the proposition that one person
experiences the same utility as another from a given amount of wealth was scientifically
meaningless because it could not be tested.156 In a widely quoted passage Robbins reasoned
suppose that we differed about the satisfaction derived by A from an income of 1,000 £,
and the satisfaction derived by B from an income of twice that magnitude. Asking them
would provide no solution. Supposing they differed. A might urge that he had more
satisfaction than B at the margin. While B might urge that, on the contrary, he had more
satisfaction than A. We do not need to be slavish behaviourists to realise that here is no
scientific evidence. There is no means of testing the magnitude of A's satisfaction as
compared with B's. If we tested the state of their blood-streams, that would be a test
of blood, not satisfaction. Introspection does not enable A to discover what is going on in
B's mind, nor B to discover what is going on in A's. There is no way of comparing the
satisfactions of different people.157
Everything that Robbins said in this passage is very likely true. Nevertheless it did not
entirely end the debate over interpersonal utility comparisons. First, Robbins was writing in a
positivistic tradition obsessed with limitations on scientific inquiry into state of mind.158 He
simply assumed that the only “scientific” economic inquiry into welfare accordingly concerned
153
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mental state. However, if welfare is estimated objectively, by looking at such external factors as
material wealth, health, education, nutrition, shelter, productivity, or numerous other external
indicia, then interpersonal comparability is readily possible. As a matter of government policy
objective welfare judgments may be superior in any event because they more readily permit
generalization about large numbers.159
Second, Robbins’ analysis overlooked the relationship between wealth of various kinds
and human production functions. If a transfer from a rich person to a poor person also increases
productivity by taking wealth from a person for whom it has little marginal impact and giving it
to someone who becomes much more productive, then the transfer may increase welfare by
increasing economic growth.
One effect of the welfarism debate was that for some time it created a sharp divide
between neoclassical welfare economics and more applied branches of economics, including
state economic policy making. The same issue also divided neoclassical welfare economics from
most of the other social sciences.160 In neoclassical economics textbooks, authors talked about
wealth transfers as if economics should be indifferent to them. The real concern of economics
was said to be allocative efficiency, typically measured by Paretian criteria and the deadweight
loss caused by monopoly. By contrast, economic policy during the New Deal and after took the
distribution of wealth very seriously and developed important governmental programs designed
to give effect to these concerns.161 Even in public utility law, the goal of universal service for
such things as electricity and telephone might be viewed as distributive, at least for those
customers who cannot even pay the variable costs of their service.162
Today, it seems safe to say, concerns about distribution have dramatically re-entered the
picture, although the concerns tend to focus on productivity rather than on Robbins’ states of
mind.163
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Actuarial Conceptions of Value and Risk
The marginalist revolution in economics gave us two fundamental shifts in thinking about
economic value. One was the relationship between schedules of demand and the various types of
costs that determine output and price. This shift accounts for previously discussed issues such as
cost-of-service ratemaking.164
The other shift was in forward rather than backward looking conceptions of value. That
shift brought much needed realism to the commercial and legal system. For example, the
classical notion that the value of a corporation is determined by the amount of historically
contributed capital bore no useful relationship to the value of a firm in the eyes of prospective
shareholders or creditors.165 Indeed, the only date on which a firm could meaningfully be said to
be worth its paid in value was the day it commenced operations. After that its value could go
either up or down, and often in a relatively short period of time. Some firms that started out with
little capital became enormous and extravagantly wealthy. Others, which were much better
financed to begin with, soon went broke. It all depended on luck, managerial success, the market
success of new products or services, and the comparative success or failures of rivals.
All of this is to say that while the marginalist theory of corporate valuation was a
significant improvement, reflecting market realities, it enormously complicated decisions about
valuation. In classical corporate finance theory a judge could determine whether stock was
“watered” – i.e., whether its capital was overstated – by doing a little arithmetic with cash
payments and slightly more complex valuation with noncash contributions. But basing the value
of a firm on its market prospects was much more difficult, because it included risk and
uncertainty in the calculation,166 as well as a far greater number of variables. The value of a firm
became a composite answer to questions about the future value of a firm’s products, its capacity
to manufacture, various anticipated headwinds in sources of supply and labor relations, the
anticipated health of its rivals, the value and remaining life of intellectual property portfolios, the
expected health of the economy overall, and expectations about the national or perhaps world
physical and regulatory environment.
In addition, actuarial conceptions of risk, which depend entirely on marginalist tools,
facilitated significant changes in the theory of firm risk bearing as well as the insurance
industry.167 The common law itself began to adopt more actuarial, or risk driven, conceptions of
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legal duties that governed things such as long-term (relational) contracting and the
implementation of negligence and products liability rules in tort.168
These developments began early in the history of marginalist thought and have had
staggering implications for regulation. The science of risk management has essentially
developed into economically sophisticated and technical private and public branches. Private
risk management refers mainly to how firms make longer run investment or management
decisions in the presence of risk. The public branch is devoted mainly to problems of
externalities or spillovers where government intervention is thought necessary.169 These are
most likely to occur when one person’s or firm’s activities cause harm to someone else.
The balance of this paper focuses on two areas of interest, although there are many, many
others.
Marginalism and the Common Law from Holmes to Torts
The first marginalist legal scholar in the United States was Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
who devoted much of his academic writing to risk management and the common law legal
system. Much has been written about the influence of Darwin on Holmes’s thought, but much
less about Holmes’s marginalism, the other Victorian science that certainly had a more
significant impact on his thinking.170 This was already reflected in Holmes’ lectures published
as The Common Law (1881). In his chapter on tort law he wrote that "… the safest way to secure
care is to throw the risk upon the person who decides what precautions shall be taken." Further, the
risk must generally be assigned to the person in control of outcomes. He also defended aggressive
rules for highly dangerous conduct that "throw the risk upon the party pursuing it." In contract law
he argued that contracts should be viewed as "the taking of a risk" and a set of bets about the future.
Consequential damages were not appropriate "unless the assumption of that risk is to be taken as
having fairly entered into the contract."171 While Holmes was not an economically technical
marginalist, many of these ideas eventually worked their way into the law and economics
movement.
Relatedly, Holmes’s external standard became a way of conforming individual activity to
social norms so as to minimize risk. The legal system cannot assess states of mind; it can only
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control behavior.172 For that, Holmes posited the “average” person in “temperament, intellect and
education”173 as the common law norm. Conduct that fell below that norm could rightfully be
condemned as negligent.174
What Holmes did not fully articulate is that he was turning the “private” common law into a
social control device. Holmes worked out the skeleton of a system in which deterrence at the
margin became the goal of judge made legal policy, with the “average man” as the determinant of
the standard. Further, it was forward looking. Holmes repeatedly emphasized that the operative
characteristic of his average person was reasonable foresight. "If the intervening events are of such
a kind that no foresight could have been expected to look out for them, the defendant is not to blame
for having failed to do so," Holmes wrote about proximate cause in tort law.175 Judge Learned
Hand’s objective cost-benefit test for negligence augmented this by adding marginalist
quantification to foresight.176 That test – that an action is negligent if the marginal cost of the
untaken precaution would have been less than the marginal cost of the accident it would have
prevented (probability X magnitude) -- represented the triumph of pure marginalism in tort law.177
As one pair of authors articulate the test:
The marginal Hand rule states that the injurer is negligent if the marginal cost of his or
her precaution is less than the resulting marginal benefit. Thus, the injurer is liable under
the Hand rule when further precaution is cost-justified.178
Today it has become conventional to regard the Carroll Towing rule as requiring a
comparison of the marginal cost of precautions against the anticipated cost of an accident. An
efficient actor, at the margin, equates the two.179 That approach has also been substantially
E.g., id. at 49 (even criminal law is indifferent to states of mind; rather its purpose is “to induce
external conformity to rule”); id. at 62-63 (“The charge of malice aforethought in an indictment for
murder has been shown not to mean a state of the defendant’s mind, as is often thought, except in the
sense that he knew circumstances which did in fact make his conduct dangerous.”); id. at 136
(“recklessly” does not mean “actual personal indifference to the truth….” Rather, “its means only that the
data for the statement were so far insufficient that a prudent man could not have made it without leading
to the inference that he was indifferent…. [I]f a man makes his statement on those data, he is liable,
whatever was the state of his mind.”).
173
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174
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mean the actual state of the defendant’s mind, but a failure to act as a prudent man of average intelligence
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written into the test for dangerous and defective products given in the Restatement (Third) of
Products Liability that “… a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design.”180 This language effectively turns the definition of a dangerous and
defective products into an exercise in risk management and cost-benefit analysis. As a common
law rule, of course, it does not “regulate” in the command and control sense, but rather imposes
liability after the fact. However, federal agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) operate under the same standard for ex ante product safety requirements.181
The more salient fact is that this rule, much like the previous risk-utility test used in tort cases,
incorporates regulatory principles into the common law using marginalist formulations that
compare the marginal cost of precautions against marginal benefits – in the words of one
important scholar of products liability, “the level at which the marginal cost of the investment equals
the marginal cost of product-related accidents thereby avoided.”182

Innovation Risk and PTAB Patent Review
Innovation often requires firms to take on a great deal of cost, risk, and uncertainty. A
well designed patent system should manage it effectively. The consensus is strong that a patent
system is necessary to facilitate innovation,183 and of course the Constitution expressly
authorizes its creation.184 The appropriate question is not whether to regulate, but rather how to
regulate. If the marginal exclusion created by the patent system is too small, some socially
valuable inventions will not be created, or perhaps will not be created as early. On the other
hand, if the patent system over-excludes, it acts as a clog on the flow of technology. The trick is
to find the sweet spot between excessive and inadequate protection.185
Considered in isolation, the initial system under which patent applications are evaluated
and granted suggests significant deficiencies. First, it is largely ex parte, which means that the
examiner hears almost exclusively from proponents of the patent.186 Second, patent examiners
180
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do not have the time or resources to give each patent application adequate consideration. On
average a patent receives eighteen or fewer hours of examination.187 The average number of
claims in a patent hovers at around 16-18,188 which suggests that examiners spend about an hour
per claim evaluating patents, disregarding the time they need to spend on other portions of the
patent application. As a result too many invalid patents are granted. When patent validity is
litigated in an adversarial setting, where considerably more resources are put into the analysis, as
many as 60% or even more of these already issued patents are found completely or partially
invalid.189
Invalidity rates are only a part of the problem. In addition, a very large number of legally
valid patents have no economic value. They may be perfectly valid as a matter of patent law, but
they are worthless because there is no market for them. The technologies they invent may be too
costly in relation to what they provide. There may be better methods for doing the same thing.
They may be solutions in search of a problem. In any event, more than 90% of issued patents are
never licensed, and of these a high percentage are never commercialized at all.190 Only 1-3% of
issued patents are ever litigated, and the rate has been declining, which is consistent with the
proposition that the commercial value of issued patents (aside from validity questions) is
declining as well.191 Further, patent litigation is very expensive, ranging from $600k where less
than $1m is at risk, to approximately $5m when the amount at risk exceeds $25m.192
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While patent examiners are trained to consider questions of legal validity, they do not
generally consider commercial value or success, except in obvious cases of patents that clearly
do not work or are useless on their face.193 One can only imagine, but requiring examiners to test
unissued patents for commercial value would increase examination costs enormously, even
assuming they were capable of doing it. The best way to test commercial, as opposed to legal,
value is through the market. A legally valid patent is commercially valuable if at least one firm
wants to license it or produce technology or processes that infringe it.
A rational system for optimizing patent issuance must be responsive to concerns about
both invalidity and economic value. Further, it must make these evaluations at reasonable cost.
The patent examining process assesses legal validity, but economic value is best assessed by the
relevant parties’ willingness to put resources into validity determinations. If a patent is
economically worthless it is unlikely that people will object to it or dispute its validity, because it
does not interfere with their business.
In its 2018 Oil States decision the Supreme Court approved a sensible regulatory
approach to the system that assesses the legal validity of patents prior to litigation.194 The
challenged administrative process, called inter partes review,195 permits any person to ask the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to reconsider and, if necessary, cancel one
or more claims in an issued patent.196 The procedure is administrative but adversarial. Both the
patentee and the challenger have participation rights, including the right to present evidence,
make arguments, and have a hearing before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).197 This
makes the process significantly different and more demanding than the type of ex parte
examination that goes on during initial patent prosecution. However, it is also much less costly
than patent infringement litigation in a federal court. Most particularly, PTAB review is limited
to questions of validity under §§102 and 103 of the Patent Act; it does not consider infringement.
The PTAB decision is fully reviewable on appeal to the Federal Circuit in which both the
patentee and the challenger are entitled to be parties, as well as PTAB itself.198
The PTAB proceeding permits the Agency to do a much more thorough and yet relatively
low cost review of patent validity.199 The costs of administrative inter partes review are
dramatically lower than the cost of litigation, running around $275k through a PTAB hearing and
$350k through appeal.200 One Amicus in Oil States estimated the cost differential between
193
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litigation and inter partes review as exceeding ten to one.201 Importantly, however, the costs are
not zero, and as a result someone must have a financial incentive to challenge a patent. Most
likely, this is someone producing technology that arguably infringes the patent in question,
assuming it is valid. That is to say, patents that are challenged in a PTAB inter partes proceeding
very likely do have positive commercial value, assuming they are valid, or no one would bother
to challenge them.
Some critics of this administrative inter partes review system lament that it undermines a
“strong patent system.”202 That is an odd use of terminology, in which “strong patent system”
actually becomes a synonym for protection of weak patents. It is as if a military general who,
upon being instructed to raise a strong army, responded by abolishing or downgrading
requirements for physical and mental fitness. That might produce a lot of soldiers, but not likely
a stronger army. You don’t protect a strong patent system by approving lots of weak patents, but
rather by coming up with a rational, cost-effective system for distinguishing those patents that
make the requisite contribution to technological progress from those that do not.
The two stage patent evaluation system that inter partes review permits is an efficient
application of the economics of information. In George Stigler’s words, “the optimum amount
of search will be such that the marginal cost of search equals the expected increase in
receipts….”203 At the initial grant stage relatively few resources are committed to establishing
validity – a rational decision given that so many patents are commercially worthless anyway.
While the error rate is high, the likelihood that anyone will be harmed is relatively low.204 Once
their commercial value has been declared via a PTAB validity challenge, however, the stakes
have gone up and a more costly examination is called for. One additional likely effect is that in
the residual patent infringement cases in the district courts a relatively higher percentage of
resources will go to questions of infringement, including claim construction, rather than validity.
Questions of infringement typically do not second guess the patent issuance process. Rather,
they accept the patentee’s claims as given and consider the scope of the accused device or
process.
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The patent system, including inter partes review before PTAB, is intended to manage
both the very considerable social risk and cost attending innovation as well as its private costs.
As with so many marginalist institutions, its job is to thread the needle between a policy that
properly incentivizes useful and worthwhile technology while leaving the channels open for
other development. An overly aggressive patent system is bad for the dissemination of
technological progress just as much as an underdeterrent one.
Conclusion
In our current era in which agency review is under attack it is worth considering exactly
what we would have to do to roll the clock back. While this paper does not prove the point, it
does suggest that returning to a world in which generalist judges are responsible for devising and
executing regulatory policy will require nothing less than reversing the marginalist revolution
itself.

